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Abstract
Governments sometimes encourage or impose individual self-protection
measures, such as wearing a protective mask when going outside dur-
ing an epidemic. However, by reducing the risk of being infected by
others, more self-protection may lead each individual to go outside
more often. In the absence of lockdown, this creates a “collective
offsetting effect”, since more people outside means that the risk of in-
fection is increased for all. Yet, wearing masks also creates a positive
externality on others, by reducing the risk of infecting them. We show
how to integrate these different effects in a simple model, and we dis-
cuss when self-protection efforts should be encouraged (or deterred)
by a social planner.
1 Introduction
This note considers an economy where citizens enjoy going outside, though
this increases the risk of catching, and spreading, a disease. In this economy,
we examine the impact on welfare of a compulsory self-protection regulatory
measure, such as wearing a mask. In a society without any lockdown, one
may argue that imposing that people wear masks is socially beneficial, as it
may reduce infection rates (Abaluck et al. 2020). Indeed, several countries
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have made it mandatory to wear masks in public in face of Covid-19.1 This
note calls for a more detailed analysis.
One may first wonder why governments interfere in self-protection deci-
sions that are normally left to each individual sovereignty. Therefore, the
first issue to be clarified is the dual role of a mask: it protects the wearer
from being infected by others, but it may also protect others from being
infected by the wearer. The latter is a positive externality that justifies a
public intervention.
A second step is to take into account that agents adapt their behavior to
the regulatory measure. Indeed, since wearing a protective mask decreases
the risk that an individual catches the disease, it may in turn incite this
individual to go more often outside, or more generally to increase his exposure
to risk. This offsetting effect refers to the well-known Peltzman (1975)’s
article about car seatbelts. This effect by itself cannot reduce the individual’s
welfare since the risk exposure (e.g., the time spent outside, or the driving
speed) is optimally chosen by the individual.
Things become even more complex when taking into account the collective
nature of an epidemic. Indeed, the probability that an agent becomes infected
depends not only on the time he spends outside, but also on how much time
other agents spend outside. This generates a “collective offsetting effect”:
since everybody has an extra incentive to go outside when wearing a mask, it
becomes theoretically possible that such a compulsory increase in individual
self-protection eventually hurts welfare (even if masks are costless), once
these behavioral responses are taken into account.
We develop a model to evaluate these different effects, in the spirit of Hoy
and Polborn (2015) (see the related literature below). A key role is played by
the probability of being infected, which depends on four variables: the agent’s
choice of risk-exposure (i.e., how much time spent outside), the agent’s com-
pulsory level of self-protection, and the same two variables averaged on the
general population.
We show that the collective offsetting effect may or may not increase
the probability of infection, depending on the elasticity of risk-exposure with
respect to the probability of getting infected. We also characterize when
public incentives for self-protection exceed private incentives. This is the case
1In April 2020, such countries include Austria, Cameroon, Chad, the Czech Republic,
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Luxembourg, Morocco, the Philippines, Singapore, Slovenia,
Taiwan, and some provinces in China and Italy. During the 1918 flu pandemic, wearing a
mask was made compulsory in some parts of the US.
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in particular when the above elasticity is not too high (so that the collective
offsetting effect is not too strong), and self-protection is asymmetrical, i.e.
the benefits from wearing a mask are borne by other agents more than by
the wearer.
We finally note that these results may help to evaluate the impacts of
other self-protection devices such as seatbelts in transport, helmets in sports
(Schelling 1973), or anti-infection drugs (such as the PrEP for HIV) in health
for instance.
1.1 Related literature
Peltzman (1975) finds that people adjust their behavior in response to the
perceived level of risk, becoming less careful if they feel more protected.
He shows empirically that imposing seatbelts to drivers led to an increase
in the number of car accidents, thus offsetting the benefit of the reduction
in accident severity. Similarly, Viscusi (1984) examined the impact of a
Food and Drug Administration (FDA)’s regulation imposing child resistant
packaging on drugs, and provided evidence that parents reacted by increasing
children’s access to drugs. In a recent contribution, Chong and Restrepo
(2017) review the empirical literature on the Peltzman effect.
Hoy and Polborn (2015) study the impact of a better self-protection tech-
nology in a general strategic model with externalities. They derive conditions
on the model’s primitives under which an improved technology increases or
decreases players’ equilibrium utilities. We extend their analysis by compar-
ing private and public incentives to self-protect, and by considering that self-
protection may also help protect others (as is the case with masks). Gossner
and Picard (2005) also study the value of an improvement risk protection (i.e.
road safety) in the presence of an offsetting effect. However, in their model,
the interaction across agents does not come from individual self-protection
efforts, but from a financial externality through the insurance market.
Finally, several papers (e.g., Shogren and Crocker 1991, Muermann and
Kunreuther 2008, Lohse et al. 2012) examine a collective self-protection
model where the probability that an agent faces a damage depends on his
own as well as others’ actions as a result of a Nash equilibrium. However,
these papers do not specifically study how a better self-protection technology
affects this probability, and in turn affects the agents’ behavioral response
and welfare.
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2 A simple model
Preferences For a representative individual, the basic trade-off is between
spending time  outside, with utility (), and reducing the probability 
of being infected, with a utility cost that we normalize to one. The self-
protection level  allows to reduce this probability, but it is costly. Overall, an
agent’s preferences are represented by the following function of four variables:
()− ()− ( )
We assume that  is strictly concave, and that  is weakly convex, with
suitable Inada conditions. The key role is played by the probability function
. It is assumed twice differentiable. It increases with the choice of risk-
exposure , and also with the other agents’ choice  of the same variable.
Similarly, it is reduced by the self-protection effort , and also by the other
agents’ self-protection efforts . Later on, we shall specialize this function
as follows:
Assumption 1 Let ( ) = +1() with   ≥ 0, and func-
tion  decreasing in both arguments.
One justification is as follows. The variables  and  determine the
number of meetings, or interactions, between the agent under consideration,
and the other agents. A multiplicative form is natural, as is assumed in
simple epidemiological models such as the S-I-R model. The latter model
typically focuses on the linear case when  = 0 and  = 1, and we slightly
generalize it to allow for non-linearities. The function  is not necessarily
symmetrical: one may protect others by wearing a mask, without being
protected from others’ infections.2 The relative importance of these two
effects will be measured by the ratio .
Individual decisions Given his environment, as characterized by the val-
ues of  and , an agent chooses  and  by maximizing utility, with first-
order conditions (subscripts denote partial derivatives)
0() = ( ) − 0()− ( ) = 0
2Note that the degree of self-protection is modeled as a continuous variable. For masks,
one may think about the proportion of time when a mask is worn, or about an approxi-
mation for the existence of various types of masks (e.g., home made cloth masks, surgical
masks or N95 respirators). Note that in general when a mask is more protective to the
wearer, it is also more protective to other agents.
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The first condition defines a choice  as a function of ; this function
is increasing under Assumption 1. This is the Peltzman (1975)’s effect: a
higher level of self-protection the agent increases his risk-exposure when the
environment becomes safer. This also invites us to define  as the elasticity
of the risk-exposure  with respect to the probability of infection, by the
usual equality:3




The second condition is active only when  is not a compulsory require-
ment. It will be used to compare private and public incentives for self-
protection.
Policy and equilibrium Consider a continuum of identical agents, with
the above preferences. A social planner imposes the value of , so that  = .
Each agent reacts accordingly by choosing , as explained above. Because
each such choice depends on the other agents’ average choice , one has
to characterize a Nash equilibrium. Under standard regularity assumptions,
and in particular under Assumption 1, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium
() for each value of , and it is characterized by the following equality:
0(()) = (() ()  )
It is easily checked that under Assumption 1, () is increasing with
. This is the collective offsetting effect: when everybody wears a mask,
everybody is tempted to go outside more often, and the equilibrium organizes
all these decisions in a consistent way.
Effect of the policy on the equilibrium probability of infection The
equilibrium probability of infection
∗() ≡ (() ()  )
depends on the policy , as follows:
∗
0
() = ( + ) + ( + )
0()
3More precisely, this is the elasticity of risk-exposure with respect to the marginal
probability of infection for an additional unit of time spent outside, i.e. . From the
first-order condition, we can indeed write the demand function  defined by 0(()) = 






The first term in parenthesis is negative: it is the direct effect of imposing
 to all agents. But the second term is the collective offsetting effect, and it
goes in the opposite direction. In general, the comparison is ambiguous, but
we can provide a more clearcut result, as follows:4
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, the equilibrium probability of infection
∗ decreases with the compulsory self-protection effort  if and only if the
elasticity of risk-exposure with respect to the probability of infection is less
than one, i.e.   1.
The result is intuitive: if people’s reaction to an increase in  in terms of
risk-exposure is sufficiently strong then it may more than offset the impact of
 so that the probability of infection may eventually increase in the economy.
Importantly, note that the result only depends on a single parameter, .5
Hence, even if others’ behaviors do not affect the probability of infection,
i.e.  = 0, the result still depends on the same condition on  capturing the
individual reaction to a change in . This proposition raises the question of
how to estimate in practice the elasticity of risk-exposure with respect to the
probability of infection.
Public vs. private incentives for self-protection In a welfarist vision
of the world, a public policy should be maximizing welfare, which is in general
not equivalent to minimizing the probability of infection. Here, welfare is
 () = (())− ()− (() ()  )
so that, thanks to the envelope theorem:
 0() = −0()−  −  − 0()
The first two terms measure the private incentive for self-protection, as
observed in the paragraph on individual decisions. The public policy should
support or deter self-protection, according to the sign of the remaining terms.
The direct effect (−) is positive: this is the positive externality of wearing
a mask, normally justifying a public policy. But the collective offsetting effect
4The Propositions are demonstrated in the appendix.
5The knife-edge case  = 1 corresponds to () = log , for which a change in  has no
impact on the probability of infection.
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goes once more in the opposite direction: masks lead people to increase their
risk-exposure.
To go further, we use our assumption regarding the shape of the proba-
bility. We obtain:
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1, public policy should support self-protection







The left-hand side is a measure of the elasticity of behavior. In particular,
when the probability of infection is simply proportional to  (i.e.,  = 0) and
 (i.e.,  = 1), then this term reduces to the elasticity . The right-hand
side is the ratio of the strength of the positive externality , to the strength
of the self-protection effect . In a symmetrical case, the two effects are
equivalent, and then we would be back to the inequality   1. To illustrate
the inequality, we further discuss a few simple cases.
The case when individuals do not react When risk-exposure is fixed,
approximated here by  → 0, then the positive externality alone (  0)
justifies a public support to self-protection. More generally, a decrease in 
increases public support.
The case when the offsetting effect is purely individual This case
corresponds to a probability of infection that does not depend on , i.e.
 = 0. In that case, a public policy is also justified. The effect on the
probability of infection still depends on the same comparison of  to 1. More
generally, a decrease in  increases public support.
The case when self-protection does not protect others In standard
self-protection cases, such as for seatbelts or helmets, there is no positive
externality associated with self-protection, i.e.  = 0.
6 In those cases,
public policy should not support individual self-protection, but rather deter
it in fact. This holds as soon as there is a strictly positive collective offsetting
effect through   0, which makes everyone increasing risk exposure at an
over-optimal collective level.
6We exclude here the externalities passing through the health system.
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3 Conclusion
We have discussed whether individual self-protection measures should be
publicly encouraged in a situation where self-protection induces both exter-
nalities and offsetting effects. We have shown that this should be the case
when the collective offsetting effect is not too strong. We have also shown
that this depends on the respective strength of the two-sided impact of self-
protection: protecting oneself and protecting others.
We finally emphasize several assumptions of our analysis that limit its
practical policy relevance in face of an epidemic such as Covid-19. First, we
assume that the government can control individual self-protection measures
such as wearing a mask in public but cannot control individual risk-exposure
such as the time spent outside by citizens. Hence, we essentially consider
a post-lockdown economy where people can go outside freely, and in which
(costly) masks are made available and possibly compulsory for everyone.
Second, we assume that individuals correctly perceive the risks. Yet, if
the public for instance overestimate the efficacy of the mask as a protective
technology, individuals may mistakenly over-expose themselves to the risk
because of a “feeling of safety”. This may call for public intervention (Salanié
and Treich, 2009).
Third, as in Hoy and Polborn (2015), we consider a continuum of identical
agents. In particular, we do not keep track of the health status (susceptible
or infected) of agents. Embedding the analysis in a fully dynamic epidemio-
logical model would be much more complex.7
Finally, there are certainly other (positive) externalities associated with
going outside during an epidemic. The deployment of masks in public areas
and workplaces may help the global economy restart with benefits for all
(Polyakova et al. 2020). Hence, our study only enlightens a few specific
facets of a much broader and complex economic problem.
7See Geoffard and Philippon (1996) for how to identify the impact of self-protection
efforts on the dynamics of an epidemic.
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Proof Appendix:
The proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 simplify the general equations in the
text, by applying Assumption 1. The Nash equilibrium outcome () is
characterized by
0+( )
so that the derivative 0() is given by:
0()
£
00 − ( + 1)( + )+−1¤ = ( + 1)+( + )
Now, from the definition of  and the first-order condition, one has



















Because  is decreasing with both arguments, this shows that () is
increasing. The derivative of the probability ∗ with respect to  is
+1+( + ) + 
0+




+  + )− ( + 1 + ) + 

which has the same sign as
 + 1 +  − (1

+  + ) = 1− 1


This shows Proposition 1. For Proposition 2, the difference between pub-
lic and private first-order conditions equals
− − 0+[− − 0]
which has the same sign as
− + 1

+  + 
( + )
from which we get the inequality in the Proposition.
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